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defining Friendship – The Modern Concept

















single-minded﻿ in﻿ the﻿pursuit﻿of﻿an﻿overarching﻿goal﻿as﻿ to﻿see﻿ the﻿deliberate﻿ formation﻿of﻿human﻿
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Men address as friends their fellow travellers on a voyage, their fellow soldiers, and similarly also 
those who are associated with them in other kinds of communities. Friendship is present to the extent 
that men share something in common, for that is also the extent to which they share a view of what 
is just. (Nicomachean Ethics, VIII 9, 1159b27-31)
In﻿these﻿lines﻿Aristotle﻿blends﻿descriptive﻿and﻿evaluative﻿notions:﻿having﻿noted﻿that﻿friendship﻿
flourishes﻿in﻿all﻿sorts﻿of﻿communities,﻿he﻿draws﻿attention﻿to﻿its﻿potential﻿to﻿contribute﻿to﻿the﻿political﻿
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... other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their rational capacities (their innate 
or trained abilities), and their enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater 
its complexity.5 (Rawls, 1971: 426)
Primary﻿or﻿perfect﻿friendship﻿is﻿a﻿friendship﻿that,﻿unlike﻿the﻿friendships﻿of﻿mere﻿pleasure﻿or﻿
utility,﻿engages﻿the﻿beings﻿of﻿the﻿friends﻿at﻿a﻿deep﻿level.﻿The﻿closeness﻿between﻿the﻿friends﻿and﻿the﻿
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deFINING FRIeNdSHIP PHILOSOPHICALLy: KANT
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... if we can free ourselves of this constraint [our distrust of others], if we can unburden our heart 
to another, we achieve complete communion. That this release may be achieved, each of us needs 
a friend, one in whom we can confide unreservedly, to whom we can disclose completely all our 
dispositions and judgments, from whom we can and need hide nothing, to whom we can communicate 
our whole self. On this rests the friendship of dispositions and fellowship.8 (Lectures on Ethics, trans. 
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In﻿The Metaphysics of Morals,﻿having﻿anticipated﻿the﻿above﻿objection,﻿he﻿sought﻿to﻿counter﻿it﻿
by﻿arguing﻿that﻿friendship﻿cannot﻿generate﻿precise﻿determinant﻿maxims:
... pragmatic friendship, which burdens itself with the ends of others, although out of love, can have 
neither the purity nor the completeness requisite for a precisely determinant maxim; it is an ideal of 
one’s wishes, which knows no bound in its rational concept but which must always be very limited 
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of﻿ agents﻿ and﻿circumstances.﻿According﻿ to﻿ those﻿ conceptions,﻿ the﻿ status﻿of﻿ someone﻿as﻿ a﻿ friend﻿
entitles﻿him/her﻿to﻿a﻿depth﻿of﻿moral﻿consideration﻿that﻿is﻿not﻿due﻿to﻿those﻿who﻿are﻿not﻿friends.﻿Moral﻿
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Let this law be established in friendship: neither ask dishonourable things, nor do them, if asked. 
And dishonourable it certainly is, and not to be allowed, for anyone to plead in defence of offences 
committed in general and especially of those against the State, that he committed them for the sake 




“That soul there, which has the worst punishment,
Is Judas Iscariot,” my master said,
“With his head inside, and kicking his legs.”
Of the other two, who hang upside-down,
The one who hangs from the black face is Brutus;







Christian Friendship: A Shift of Paradigm
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The neighbour is your equal. The neighbour is not your beloved for whom you have a passionate 
partiality. Nor, if you are an educated man, is your neighbour the one who is educated, with whom you 
are equal in education – for with your neighbour you have equality before God. Nor is your neighbour 
the one who is more distinguished than yourself, that is, he is not your neighbour because he is more 
distinguished than yourself ... Nor is your neighbour one who is inferior to you, that is, insofar as he 
is humbler than yourself, he is not your neighbour ...The neighbour is every man; for he is not your 
neighbour through the difference, or through the equality with you as in your difference from other 
men. He is your neighbour through equality with you before God, but every man unconditionally has 
this equality, and has it unconditionally. (Kierkegaard, Works of Love: 50)





















If a man should importune me to give a reason why I loved him, I find it could not otherwise be expressed, 
than by making answer: because it was he, because it was I. There is, beyond all that I am able to say, 
I know not what inexplicable and fated power that brought on this union. (Essays, I, XXVIII)
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eNdNOTeS
1.﻿﻿ This﻿ is﻿ so,﻿ it﻿would﻿appear,﻿even﻿ in﻿ the﻿case﻿of﻿patients﻿suffering﻿ from﻿schizophrenia﻿and﻿other﻿split﻿
personality﻿disorders.﻿The﻿ issue﻿ is,﻿however,﻿ too﻿complex﻿and﻿contentious﻿ to﻿be﻿examined﻿within﻿ the﻿
scope﻿of﻿this﻿essay.
2.﻿﻿ With﻿apologies﻿to﻿Lydia,﻿the﻿cat﻿who﻿has﻿done﻿her﻿best﻿to﻿slow﻿down﻿the﻿process﻿of﻿writing﻿this﻿essay.
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